你相信中国的财务报表吗？许多投资者的答案恐怕是“不”（一些卖空投资者肯定也是这个答案）。嘉汉林业，这家在多伦多上市的比较大的林业公司，就是一个明显的例子。去年，卖空投资者Muddy Waters控告该公司正在操作 “庞氏骗局”，但它却拒不承认。今年1月31日，嘉汉林业宣布公开发布公司董事会独立委员会的最终报告，公司内部人士声称控告方并没有确凿的证据。这也是控告方郁闷的地方，因为缺乏足够的证据，他们也“无法得出最终结论”。
美国证券交易所（SEC）想逼迫德勤会计师事务所上海分公司——西方某大型会计公司，上交Longtop公司的相关资料。Longtops公司是去年被纽约证券交易所退市的一家中国软件公司。德勤拒绝了，原因是这么做会触犯中国 “国家秘密法”。德勤自有它的考虑，因为如果答应了，它在中国的员工将会因触犯当地法律被判入狱。
当一个中国公司通过购买一家外国公司获得上市时，许多财务问题便会因这种反向收购而产生。香港中文大学的T.J.Wong研究过200个有关中国公司在西方反向收购的案例，他发现其中许多都出现了问题。这些问题的典型情况便是一些小私营公司选择通过走后门在西方上市，因为他们不能在香港上市 （在香港，反向收购是被禁止的）。
西方各会计公司已经开始谴责把它们的好名声借给缺乏诚信的中国公司这种行为。但是某四大会计事务所一位负责国际业务的管理者说这不公平。最初的156个中国反向收购案例并不是通过西方会计师审计的，他说，而是通过它们在中国的竞争对手。他坚称四大会计师事务所已经对中国大大提高了警觉。
中欧国际商学院的Michael Thompson认为中国的公司监管法比想象中要好。中国提倡经理的独立性，把董事会主席与行政总裁两个职位区分开，同时赋予股东们很多权利。
许多当前财务接受审查的公司，问题出在它们的注册地在开曼群岛这些中国法律管辖不到的地方。而这些公司通过反向收购在美国上市所钻的空子是美国提供的，而不是中国。
中国公司监管存在的最大问题并不法律，而在于中国政府是否能公平地贯彻实施这些法律。Kobre & Kim律师事务所的William McGovern律师是前美国证券交易所的执法人员，他认为美国监管部门在安然溃败后采取的一系列强势措施重建了美国市场的信心。中国现在面临的是同样的信任危机，但McGovern先生发现中国的监管部门还没有在本国采取果断措施，也没有和SEC这样的外国机构进行合作的意思。并非所有中国公司都在违法经营——但除非中国真正严肃地对待企业监管的问题，否则投资者不得不继续保持谨慎态度。
CAN you trust Chinese accounts? Many investors fear (and several short-sellers are betting) that the answer is “no”. Sino-Forest, a big forestry firm listed in Toronto, is a case in point. Last year Muddy Waters, a short-seller, accused it of running a Ponzi scheme, which it denies. On January 31st Sino-Forest released the final report of independent investigators into the charge. Insiders crow that the gumshoes found no smoking gun. The gumshoes grumbled that, lacking access to all the evidence, they were “not able to reach definitive conclusions”.
America’s SEC is trying to force the Shanghai office of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, a big Western accountancy firm, to hand over papers related to Longtop, a Chinese software firm that was delisted by the New York Stock Exchange last year. Deloitte refuses, saying this would violate Chinese laws on “state secrets”. Deloitte may have a point. If it co-operates, its local staff could be jailed under Chinese law.
Many accountancy problems spring from reverse takeovers, when a Chinese firm buys a foreign one to acquire its listing. T. J. Wong of the Chinese University of Hong Kong has analysed 200 Chinese reverse takeovers in the West, and found that many have run into trouble. The troubled outfits are typically smallish private ones that opted for a backdoor Western listing because they could not list in Hong Kong (where reverse takeovers are barred).
Western accountancy firms have taken flak for lending their good names to dodgy Chinese firms. But the international boss of a Big Four accountancy firm says this is unfair. The first 156 Chinese reverse takeovers were not audited by Western accountants, he says, but by their Chinese rivals. He insists the Big Four have greatly increased their vigilance in China.
Michael Thompson of the China Europe International Business School argues that Chinese corporate-governance laws are better than people think. They call for independent directors, separate the chairman’s role from that of the chief executive, and grant shareholders many rights.
The problem with many of the firms whose accounts are currently under scrutiny is that they were registered in such places as the Cayman Islands, outside the reach of Chinese law. And the loophole that allowed them to list in America via reverse takeovers is an American loophole, not a Chinese one.
China’s biggest corporate-governance problem is not its laws, but its government’s willingness to enforce them even-handedly. William McGovern of Kobre & Kim, a lawyer and former SEC enforcement official, argues that aggressive action by American regulators after the Enron debacle restored confidence to American markets. China risks a similar crisis of confidence now, but Mr McGovern observes that its regulators have yet to act decisively at home or to co-operate with foreign agencies such as the SEC. Not all Chinese firms are crooked—but until China gets serious about regulating its companies, investors should remain wary.
