欧元区主权债务危机持续3年，德国在救市问题上依然犹豫不决，成为欧元要继续生存的一大障碍，德国必须坚守其改革欧元区的承诺。
2012年9月29日（前言：又是不堪卒读的一篇。除了一些金融知识的匮乏外，也有对古典文学的无知，歌德巨著《浮士德》中的恶魔典故对我既新鲜又陌生，即使在查过百度百科之后依然似懂非懂，不解深意。囿于时间精力，这一课还真不知何时能补上。
不过，9月到欧洲在忙碌紧张的公务中对各地古迹的匆匆一瞥倒也极大地激发了我读书学习的兴致。首先是关于欧洲观念的问题。多年前读过陈乐民先生的《欧洲观念的“历史哲学”》，从古希腊的神话讲起探讨欧洲观念的历史渊源，又在中世纪封建制度的发展中讲述民族主义的兴起，为读者呈现出的是欧洲主义和民族主义的矛盾冲突作为欧洲历史重要发展线索的独特视角，对认识欧盟的前世今生也颇具启发性。以此来看，德国，法国等单一民族国家是欧洲历史中民族主义狂飙突进的结果，而比利时，瑞士这样的多民族和谐共存的国家就是欧洲观念留给我们的风景了，应该是在欧洲各王朝的恩怨情愁中达致的妥协，也是在欧洲观念的影响下打得不可开交的各王朝间可以接受的平衡。
其次是关于基督教。从世俗权势的角度来说，基督教有长时间辉煌的统治史，在缺乏制约监督的情况下，基督教也一度由宗教信仰扩展到政治统治染指了世俗利益，宗教战争，宗教迫害，赎罪券的交易等等，教权成为所有当时社会矛盾的焦点，历经波澜壮阔的革命时代，基督教虽然退守到梵蒂冈，但仍是世人不可缺少的精神家园。其实，梵蒂冈的地位就好比英国等君主立宪国的王室家族，一方面是历史上宗教革命中各派力量平衡和解的产物，另一方面也是现实生活中保守主义的代表，警示人类在改造世界的征程中保有对自然对宇宙对人自身的敬畏之情。
三是关于共和与独裁的斗争。在罗马，随处可见两千多年前的古建筑的断壁残垣，有人类幼年时期颂扬暴力的斗兽场，也有民主共和发源的元老院议事厅等等，如果仅用震撼气势来简单形容，在我会感到是对意大利人孜孜保护古迹努力的不敬了。幸而，我随身带了一本茨威格的《人类的群星闪耀时》，其中《西塞罗》一篇的人物传记文笔优美，引人入胜，很快就引导我学习了一遍2000多年主张共和捍卫共和的西塞罗在凯撒的专制独裁面前的悲剧故事。西塞罗为保卫罗马共和体制，惨遭杀害，其头颅还被钉挂在古罗马广场上讲坛上示众，惨不忍睹。作者对罗马民众反应的描写也是入木三分：“民众胆战心惊的拥挤在讲坛周围，他们心情压抑，深感羞愧，然后又退缩到一边。没有一个人敢说一句反对的话－－这就是独裁统治呀！不过，他们的心都在震颤，看到自己的共和国已被钉在十字架上这幅悲惨的象征画面，他们都战战兢兢地垂下了眼帘。”掩卷思量，共和与独裁的倾向都是深植于人性的，弱势时要共和，强势时要独裁，是人性之恶，在不断的纠结斗争中终究还是诞生了一批超越自身利益的伟人，令共和的种子虽历经挫折仍顽强的生存下来，成为我们今天能够幸福自由生活的基石。
行万里路，读万卷书。然而，行万里路毕竟不能替代读万卷书。在罗马，偶遇一美国老太太，面对穿越数千年的遗迹，她认真地问我“Will you read a lot of books after going back，too？" 当然，我会。
一点点的，德国正在揭开其仔细设计编制的拯救欧元区债务危机的方案，可以说这是欧元区度过危机最佳的机会了。直到本周，欧洲的官员们才开始能够设想他们凭借两个重大行动能够跑赢市场了。一是欧洲央行宣布将作为如西班牙这样债务深重的国家的最后借款人（前提是这些国家同意改革）第二是欧元区也要创设一个银行联盟来打破坏银行和坏主权债务之间的死结。现在欧洲央行已经避免了欧元区崩溃的威胁，其它一些问题也赢得了修修补补的空间与时间。
但是事情远没有这样简单。在债务国，反节约的抗议和罢工卷土重来，脱离欧元区的呼声在西班牙又高涨起来。同样令人担心的是，在债权国，去加强欧元区的行动是迟缓的，甚至有时候会出尔反尔。Ruckfall，在德语中的意思是堕落退步之意思，也可以解释欧元区现在正处在一个十分关键的危险期。
欧洲央行的主席Mario表示会有条件的出手干预危机，这也只是个开端，目的是要降低一个国家的借债成本，尤其是那些短期债务的成本，同时消除人们对于欧元区未来没有根据的担忧。Jen Weidmann，Bundes 银行的主管发起了一场要使欧洲央行拯救主权债务危机行动非合理化的运动，他甚至将Draghi比作歌德作品浮士德中的恶魔。德国政府，尽管是支持欧洲央行的计划的，但依然会对Jen的言辞感到不悦，并已经告诉西班牙不要再要求更多的帮助，而这正是欧洲央行可能采取行动的关键一步。
更加糟糕的是，针对银行联盟的Ruckfall似乎有重燃危机的可能性。6月，欧元区领袖的峰会上，与会领导人发表声明说“打破银行和主权国家之间的恶性循环是十分紧迫的”。为此，他们将创设一个独立的银行监督机构来应急。并且一旦建立之后，欧元区救助资金就会被直接用于拯救困境中的银行。这个计划的主要目的就是帮助西班牙，这已经不是什么秘密了，主要的方式就是把支持快要倒闭的银行的重担转移到欧元区，当然逆向也是成立的。爱尔兰也被告知可以得到相似的援助。
这样一个妥协方案是在满足德国一贯提倡的条件的基础上实现的，这一条件就是为了欧元区的巩固必须接受更大幅度的中央控制。但是即使在欧盟委员会在本月匆匆出台其设立银行监管机构（也是欧洲央行的一个附属机构）的方案之前，德国就一直试图阻止这一方案。委员会方案的草案中包括了要以一个欧元区的权威机构来为倒闭银行清算的内容，还有就是创建一个欧洲银行存款保证金体系。在德国的压力下，最后的版本中却没有这项内容。
很多人担心的是，在放弃了这两项内容之后，欧洲央行要负起监管银行的责任却缺少处理坏银行的手段。同时，德国也在抵制委员会要欧洲央行获得监管欧洲6000余家银行的责任的权威的方案。柏林希望清除规模小的银行，包括其自己国内一些经常陷入困境的地区银行。
德国也一直试图要放慢欧洲银行监管机构在2013年1月1日启动工作的时间表，依据是工作如此重要不应该如此草率。并且，只有在确信系统有效率之后才能启动直接银行再融资行动。本周，Wolfgang Schauble，德国的金融部长和他的荷兰芬兰同伴也决定要尽力限制承诺援助的规模，直接银行再融资只能适用于新问题，不是老债务老资产，并且只能被视作是最终援助，是在用了私人资本和国家债务之后的最终援助渠道。
德国知道它必须看管好德国自己的银行，所以必须要限制其它国家银行的债务。德国首相默克尔对于帮助其它国家也倾注了大量心血资金。在可能的时候，德国还可能将希腊所欠的债务一笔勾销。默克尔已经在为西班牙提供1000亿欧元的贷款来重组银行体系的投票中失去了其作为首相的多数优势，所以她现在不太可能立马去找Bundestag去要更多的钱，也不仅仅是因为所有的争论最后都会去欧洲央行和Mephisto解决。
经济和伦理
Mario，意大利的首相揶揄德国说，经济对于德国来说是伦理哲学的一个分支。每个国家只有在支付了赎罪券（赤字和银行监管差）之后，才可能得到欧洲的帮助在未来避免问题的重演。
但是其实在今天的危机没有解决之前就去担心未来的问题是没有任何意义的。德国害怕缓解债务国家的市场压力会带来伦理上的危险放慢需要改革的步伐，这是无可厚非的，同理，伦理的风险对于债权国也是同样存在的。当压力减轻的时候，德国并没有对改革修复欧元表现出丝毫的迫切之情。
拖延和含糊其辞也是要付出代价的。如果一个国家感到他们的噩梦没有终止的希望，要他们进行改革是困难的。除了在最绝望的时候，德国不愿意采取行动，这会让欧元区经历一个又一个危机。短期来看，默克尔可能会在欧元区仍在水深火热之中投入到争取连任的选举大战之中，长远来看，慢性长期的危机会带来永久的伤害：常态化的经济停滞和赤字国家的衰退，对政府信用信心的丧失，和对欧元未来信心的丧失，还有政治生态越来越糟。德国可能害怕重蹈过去错误的覆辙，但德国也应该担心犹豫不决和无所作为的严重后果。
STITCH by stitch, Germany is unravelling the carefully knitted deal that offered the euro zone the best chance yet of overcoming its crisis. Until this week European officials dared to imagine they had got ahead of the markets with two big moves. First, the ECB declared that it will act as a lender of last resort for troubled countries like Spain (if they agree to a reform programme). And second, the euro zone pledged to create a banking union to sever the death loop between weak banks and weak sovereigns. Now that the ECB had averted the threat of the euro breaking up, others have space and time to repair its design flaws.
If only it were so easy. Protests and strikes against austerity have restarted in debtor states, and secessionism is stirring in Spain. Just as worrying, creditor states are showing every sign of going slow, and even reneging, on their promises to strengthen the euro zone. Rückfall, the German word for backsliding, is one reason the euro zone is being pushed back into an acute phase of the crisis.
Start with the conditional promise of intervention by the ECB’s president, Mario Draghi. This is designed to hold down a country’s borrowing costs, especially for short-dated bonds, and dispel “unfounded fears” about the future of the euro. In his campaign to delegitimise the policy, Jens Weidmann, the Bundesbank chief, has resorted to drawing a parallel between Mr Draghi and Mephisto in Goethe’s “Faust”. The German government, though in favour of the ECB’s scheme, is uncomfortable. It has told Spain not to ask for more help—the essential first step that would allow the ECB to act.
Worse, the Rückfall over banking union seems almost designed to rekindle the crisis. At a summit in June euro-zone leaders declared that it was “imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”. To do so, they would create a single banking supervisor “as a matter of urgency”. And once established, euro-zone rescue funds could be used directly to recapitalise troubled banks. It is no secret that the plan was meant to help Spain, by shifting some of the burden of supporting crippled banks to the euro zone—retroactively if necessary. Ireland was told it could expect similar assistance.
This bargain was done on terms that Germany has always advocated: more central control in exchange for more solidarity. But even before the European Commission this month rushed out its proposals for a banking supervisor (an offshoot of the ECB), Germany was undermining the deal. Drafts of the commission’s plan included a commitment to complement the new supervisor with a euro-zone resolution authority to wind up failed banks (known as Edira), and a European bank-deposit guarantee scheme (aka, Edgar). Under German pressure, these were removed from the final version.
Many worry that, with the abortion of Edira and Edgar, the ECB will be responsible for overseeing banks but lack the means to deal with the bad ones. At the same time, Germany is fighting the commission’s plan for the ECB to have authority to supervise all 6,000-plus banks in the euro zone. Berlin wants to exclude smaller banks, including its own often-troubled regional lenders.
And Germany has tried to slow down the timetable for the supervisor to start work on January 1st 2013, on the grounds that such an important task should not be rushed. Thereafter, direct bank recapitalisation should only take place once the system has shown itself to be effective. This week, Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, and his über-hawkish colleagues from the Netherlands and Finland, sought greatly to limit the scope of the commitment: direct bank recapitalisation should apply only to new problems, not “legacy assets” and should only be a “last resort”, after using private capital and then national funds.
Germany knows it has to look after its own banks, so it wants to limit its liability for those of other countries. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, has already staked much treasure on helping others. At some point, Germany may have to write off part of the loans it made to Greece. Mrs Merkel already lost her “chancellor’s majority” in this summer’s vote to lend Spain up to €100 billion ($129 billion) to restructure its banks. She is not rushing back to the Bundestag to ask for more money, not least because any debate would turn to the ECB and Mephisto.
Economics and morality
Mario Monti, Italy’s prime minister, quips that, for Germany, “economics is a branch of moral philosophy”. Countries must pay for sins of commission (budget deficits) and omission (poor bank supervision). Only then can there perhaps be more European integration to avert problems in the future.
Yet there is little point in worrying about tomorrow’s woes when today’s crisis is unresolved. Germany is right to fret that relieving market pressure on debtors could create moral hazard and slow down badly needed reforms. Equally, though, moral hazard applies to creditors. When the pressure is off, Germany shows too little urgency about repairing the euro.
There is a cost to delay and prevarication. It is harder for countries to reform without hope that their agony will end. Germany’s unwillingness to act except in the most dire moments condemns the euro zone to one acute crisis after another. In the short term Mrs Merkel may thus find herself fighting for re-election next year with the euro zone back in flames. In the longer term a chronic crisis is already creating permanent damage: prolonged economic stagnation and depression in deficit countries, loss of confidence in the credibility of governments and the future of the euro, and increasingly poisonous politics. Germany may fear the “legacy” costs of past mistakes. But it should also worry about the legacy of its hesitation and inaction.
